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One  cannot  escape  today  the  refrain  that  Europe  is  facing  global  and
continental crises: economic, social, geopolitical and environmental. Yet there is
no consensus on what defines these crises. Even the meaning of the subject,
“Europe”, is a matter of contention. Is Europe the entity that shall face and
possibly overcome these crises or is it only passively subjected to them? Over
the  last  few  years  many  attempts  have  been  made  by  philosophers  and
intellectuals to write petitions and manifestos, in order to give answers to the
lack of clarity about the very idea of Europe and the possible outcomes of its
crises;1 there is  indeed widespread confusion and doubts not only amongst
Europe’s political, economic and cultural elites, but also amongst its citizenry
concerning Europe’s identity, task, role in the world, and even whether Europe
exists in a relevant sense.
This Special  Issue of  Metodo aims at addressing the issue of “crisis” from
different  angles.  Our  contention  is,  indeed,  that  an  analysis  of  the  crisis
concept, and in particular of the kind of crises which are currently affecting
Europe, necessarily requires multidisciplinary insights into the problem, which
range from philosophy to political  theory,  from economy to law. This  Issue
aims  at  generating  an  open  debate  on  this  topic,  by  engaging  different
approaches and languages.
In step with the general orientation of Metodo, we have also encouraged the
submission of papers specifically focused on the issue of contemporary crises,
in light of  the concept (or  concepts)  of  crisis,  as it  has been developed and
1 See PIKETTY et al. 2014; BALIBAR 
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expounded  by  phenomenological  philosophy.2 Can  the  phenomenological
methods and the various traditions of phenomenological philosophy be of help
in understanding the current crises in their  intertwined social,  political and
economic  dimensions?  To  answer  this  question  we  propose  a  twofold
approach:  first,  philosophical arguments and suggested methods have to be
historically contextualised and brought back to their leading intuitions. Second,
these  arguments  can  be  tentatively  applied  to  contemporary  issues.  With
regards to the context in which phenomenology addressed the crisis problem,
we might especially recall the aftermath of the First World War, as the time in
which  this  field  of  studies  emerged.  In  that  hectic  period,  Max  Scheler
pinpointed the loss of political leadership of Europe and tried to envisage a
new cultural global leadership for Europe.3 This diagnosis became even clearer
after  1933,  when  Husserl  detected  the  decline  of  the  unitary  spirit  of  the
“European sciences” and pleaded for a renewal of Enlightenment and practical
rationality,  as  the  only  chance  to  successfully  contrast  the  spreading  of
totalitarianism in  Central  Europe.4 Even after  the  end of  the  war,  however,
while the EU institutions were being shaped through a vibrant confrontation
between functionalist and federalist orientations, some of the most well-known
heirs  of  Husserlian  philosophy  maintained  a  keen  interest  in  the  idea  and
construction  of  Europe.  Among  them,  the  Czech  philosopher  Jan  Patočka
coined in the 1970s the idea of “post-Europe”.5 With this phrase, Patočka did
not aim to suggest a simple overcoming of Europe, neither as a geographical
entity nor as a political project, but rather emphasized the necessity to create a
post-European perspective, i.e. a new theoretical standpoint, from which one
can look at Europe outside of its spatial and historical borders, giving up any
strained syncretism aimed at the conciliation of the very different European
realities under a principle of identity. Right on the contrary, a post-European
perspective would consist, according to Patočka, in facing Europe and its crises,
struggling  to  maintain  widely  open  its  inner  complexity.  After  the  Velvet
Revolution in 1989, the foundation of the European Union in 1992, and the
enlargement of the Union to Central and Eastern Europe during the following
years, one can legitimately ask whether and how Patočka’s perspective can still
supply valid arguments to the current debates on Europe’s status. 
Besides the necessary contextualization, one might ask whether and how a
phenomenological insight can be useful in light of the current version of the
2 See, in particular, Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology:
an Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
3 SCHELER 1960, 185.
4 See Hua VI.
5 See, in particular, PATOČKA 1988, 207-287.
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European crisis.  In other  words,  can phenomenology serve once again as a
valid critical standpoint, and provide us with a valuable method for tackling
the predominance of economy over politics,  as it  emerged over the last  few
decades,  as  well  as  the  inability  of  European institutions  to  draft  a  shared
political  agenda,  beyond  individual  economic  interests?  In  light  of  this
question,  it  is  noteworthy that  whilst  Heidegger’s  critique  of  technique has
recently become a commonplace in contemporary anti-capitalist doctrines, only
little attention has been payed to Husserl’s position, and to his account of the
crisis of European reason. One of the aims of this Issue is precisely to create
new intercontextual interactions between Husserl’s insight into Europe’s crisis
and more recent analyses of the various fashions of today’s crisis. 
Many contributions to this Issue respond to this general aim. In his article,
Kenneth KNIES particularly addressed Husserl’s concepts of Crisis and Europe
and  provided  a  qualified  defence  of  them  against  the  critique  of  being
philosophically  and  politically  irrelevant.  Husserl  understood  the  “crisis  of
European civilization” as a crisis of rationality, i.e. as the loss of the belief that
reason constitutes the means for a universal critique of life goals. For Husserl,
Europe represents a historical, supranational unity which is guided by the idea
of rational science as an infinite task of cultural renewal. In this regard, KNIES
stresses  that  the  primary  focus  of  Husserl’s  Crisis do  not  lie  in  the
epistemological critique of the life-worldly premises of objective sciences, but
rather  in counteracting the loss  of  their  meaning,  showing how this  loss  is
mostly caused by the increasing narrowness of scopes and aims pursued by
objective sciences. Whilst at the beginning of the 20th Century the hope that
scientific reason would provide an ultimate critique of life seemed to be lost,
Husserl  claimed  that  objectivist  specialization  threatens  to  cause  the
“finitization” of  the  horizons of  rationality  and the  application  of  scientific
technology for misappropriating and de-humanizing ends – the more, indeed,
scientific  specialization  drives  technological  progress,  the  more  this
specialization  also  shows  how  rationality  is  not  concerned  with  ends.
According to KNIES, this crisis cannot be historically circumscribed to Husserl’s
concerns regarding the turmoil of Central Europe in the 1930s, but is rather
essentially related to science as such.
How  can  one  successfully  face  this  collapse  of  the  belief  in  rationality?
Husserl aims at showing that science can play the role for which it was meant,
only  if  it  is  brought  back  to  its  original  task.  Renewing  this  task  means
reintroducing the idea of a universal science, whose genealogy goes along with
the one of philosophy, and whose aim consists of fostering a radical reform and
enhancement of human civilization. 
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 European Renaissance especially embodied this task,  as it  believed in the
transformation of humanity by means of universal reason. The European era,
though,  understood  as  the  era  in  which  scientific  thought  and  technique
blossomed,  is  vulnerable  at  its  core  and  can  easily  cause  unvertainty  and
scepticism,  insofar  as  modern  science  is  intrinsically  entangled  with
methodological  crises  and  existential  problems  due  to  its  technological
application.  Particularly,  the  “finitization”  of  science’s  universal  horizon  –
which, from an encompassing critique of life-goals, ends up becoming a sheer
implementation of objectivist procedures aimed at economic wealth – makes
science even more vulnerable to the abuses that authoritarian and totalitarian
political leaders are used to perpetrate. Indeed, once the faith in reason was
lost,  totalitarian  accounts  of  nation,  class  and  race  hit  Europe,  and  science
became a tool for imperialistic projects – this is the link between the intrinsic
crisis of the European sciences and the historical crises which are explicitly and
implicitly addressed by Husserl.
KNIES claims  that  Husserl’s  answer  to  the  crisis  is  both  philosophically
(epistemologically)  and  (geo-)politically  relevant:  Europe  as  such  was  born
when  European  intellectuals  committed  themselves  to  infinite  tasks  that
undermined the ability of states to project  an ultimate life-horizon for their
citizens.  As a consequence of this, the provinciality of home-nations became
the  main  critical  target  of  those  European  intellectuals  who  strived  for  a
renovation on rational bases of local customs and norms. Accordingly, Europe
became  a  supranational  project,  a  spreading  synthesis  of  nations  not  only
united by their common origins but rather entangled in a rational exchange of
ideas and infinite tasks.
But what if  Europe,  this  supranational  and rational  project,  fails?  What if
science loses its infinite horizon? What if its abuses for the sake of economy, of
race or of state destroy the same civilisation from which it stemmed? Husserl
identifies  the  only  possible  path  out  of  the  crisis  in  a  renewed (European)
“heroism of reason”.6[6] However,  KNIES suggests that Husserl was wrong in
believing  that  scientific  rationality  can be  only European and suggests  that
decolonization  may  be  an  even  more  radical  task  to  overcome  intellectual
provinciality.
The standpoints of modern philosophies in Asia, Africa and Latin America
are in fact essential, according to Hans  SCHELKSHORN, in order to address the
crisis  of  universalism that  pertains  Europe  since  the  end of  the  nineteenth
century. Although universalism was not a European invention – pace Husserl –
SCHELKSHORN acknowledges that since the fifteenth century European powers
6 Hua VI, 348; HUSSERL 1965, 192.
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imposed  a  process  of  globalization  through  scientific  and  technological
discoveries, capitalistic industrial production, as well as by struggling for the
application of normative and legal principles that remained confined for a long
time  to  the  European  soil.7[7] In  few  decades,  the  fall  of  Byzantium,  the
Spanish  Reconquista  and  the  so-called  “discovery  of  Americas”  brought
European powers to a new global level. With the globalization of the conflicts
among European powers, at the beginning of the twentieth century, war itself
became  global  (even  in  its  label  of  “World  War”).  The  world  became
Europeanized as never before and Europe lost its hegemony, as it was split by
the Iron curtain in two spheres of external influence. After the collapse of the
Sovietic Union and a short decade of American predominance, the globus is
now dealing  with  the  adjustment  of  few regional  powers,  besides  the  U.S.
SCHELKSHORN defines this situation in terms of a “polycentric global society”
(polyzentrische Weltgesellschaft). 
Which role can Europe have in the world to come? This is the question that
SCHELKSHORN tackled while analyzing the  longue durée of  the strategy which
aimed at delimiting Europe, by opposing to it ideas and values of the “East”
(may be it Asia, Byzantium or Russia), and by excluding the Hispanic world
(both the Iberian peninsula and Latin America) from Europe’s core. Since the
fifteenth  century,  with  the  work  of  Juan  Ginés  de  Sepúlveda,  Herodot's
representation of the Persian wars, as the struggle between European freedom
and  Asiatic  despotism,  became  central  in  the  narrative  “mytho-dynamics”
(Mythomotorik) of Christian Europe against the Islamic world, as well as in the
opposition against Russia.
SCHELKSHORN underlines the crucial role that this succession of eras played for
the  birth  of  modern  Europe:  from  the  convivencia in  Al-Andalus  (i.e.  the
multicultural society among Muslims, Christians and Jews under the Islamic
domination in the Iberian peninsula), to the  reconquista  (i.e. the defeat of the
Islamic power in Andalusia), until Spanish colonialism in Latin America.
By presenting Russian and Spanish thinkers that, throughout 19th and early
20th century, addressed the question of whether (and how) Spain and Russia
belong to Europe,  SCHELKSHORN deconstructs the narratives of Europe’s core,
and  thus  contends  that  a  critical  revision  of  the  stereotypes  attributed  to
Europe’s counterparts (e.g. Asia, Islam, Russia or even Hispanic countries) is
still necessary. Only through a critical acquaintance with the complexity of the
histories of these identitarian attempts, can Europe seriously engage with its
contemporary geopolitical challenges, especially regarding Russian regaining
7 See on this, Joas 2015.
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of power at European eastern borders, the ongoing wars in the south-eastern
coasts of the Mediterranean sea, and the tragic migration of thousands who are
struggling to reach the European territory from both Africa and Central Asia.
A post-imperial delimitation of European global responsibility is here at stake.
The  “imperial  dream”  was  until  1945  the  only  paradigm  in  European
Machtpolitik. With the shift from a European to a global perspective, which the
winners of the World Wars imposed to the remains of the modern European
states, some intellectuals and politicians, committed to the European resistance
and  post-war  reconstruction,  revived  the  Kantian  regulative  idea  of  a
cosmopolitan federation of republics. Roberto  CASTALDI retraces this federalist
tradition by addressing both Norbert Elias’ analysis of the decline of European
civilization and Arnold Toynbee’s plea to European people: “unite or perish”.
In light of the current geopolitical and institutional crises, CASTALDI addresses
the threats that “de-civilizing processes” such as the economic disparities, the
crisis of the welfare-state, and the rise of populism and xenophobia, represent
for  Europe.  What  CASTALDI calls  “European  civilization”  is  actually  a  late
achievement  of  few  (Western-)European  countries  during  the  cold  war.
Shielded as they were by the American military protectorate on one side, and
goaded  on  the  other  by  the  communist  challenge,  the  states  that  built  the
European  Communities  ensured  the  respect  of  the  rule  of  law  that  their
constitutions  guaranteed  and  implemented  therefore  innovative  social
democratic  policies  which  were  carried  both  by  Christian  democrats  and
socialists. The “Fall of the Wall” accelerated the transition from the institutional
framework  of  the  European  Communities  to  the  European  Union.  After  a
decade of relative quiet  and prosperity within its  borders – from which its
neighbours did not benefit that much, as the Yugoslavian Wars bitterly showed
– a cascade of events eventually shook the fragile pillars of the Union: the 2008
economic  crises,  the  geopolitical  turmoil  in  the  Mediterranean  sea  that
followed the so-called Arab Springs, and the imperialistic policy of Russia in
Eastern Europe.
Despite the oft-told similarities between the financial and economic crisis of
2008  and  the  Great  Depression  of  1929  and its  tragic  aftermath  in  Central
Europe,  which  paved  the  way  to  the  Nazi  takeover,  the  international
community did not respond to the 2008 crisis with protectionist and nationalist
politics,  but  it  rather  attempted  to  foster  an  international  coordination.
However, as  CASTALDI stresses, this positive reaction remained stuck in inter-
governmental agreements and the European Union was thus unable to achieve
the  implementation  of  supranational  policies  that  the  Commission  and  the
European  Parliament  recommended.  In  contrast,  long-lasting  emergency
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summits of the European Council led to the application of austerity politics,
and to the implementation of ordoliberalist policies to single Member States
(see  on  this  Timo  MIETTINEN’s  contribution  to  this  issue).  In  this  context,
Germany took on, willy-nilly, the role of central power of Europe. This shift of
power  from  the  institutions  of  Europe  to  its  most  powerful  member  state
revived the fear of the geopolitical issue of the Mitte, i.e. of Europe’s core and
pivotal space. While on the one hand, in nineteenth century, Bismark aimed by
means of his  realpolitik at ruling the  Mitte,  in order to achieve and maintain
power equilibrium, on the other, in the aftermath of the first world war, the
role of this political space became a prerogative of radical ideologies, like the
one assumed by the third Reich. Against the background of this tragic past,
contemporary German elites acknowledge their pivotal role and are thus prone
to  become  economic  leaders.  Nevertheless  they  are  unwilling  to  take  the
responsibility of representing the Mitte on a geopolitical level.8[8]
The decision of ruling the monetary union as the coordination of national
politics led to a dysfunctionality of the euro, of which its designers – especially
Germany and Italy – were well aware. Nonetheless, they decided to run the
risk,  in  order  to  hopefully  overcome  France’s  resistance  to  share  economic
sovereignty.  In  2008,  Sarkozy’s  France  was  ready  to  share  the  burden  of  a
supranational umbrella, while though Merkel’s and Schäuble’s Germany was
not  ready  to  do  it  any  more.  As  a  consequence  of  this,  the  monetary
confederation imposed to the countries that adopted the euro more fiscal and
economic constraints than it  would be the case if  they were part of a fully-
fledged federation, without even relying on fiscal, economic and social federal
adjustments. Therefore the EU started to demand more and to give less than a
federation can do, and it consequently became a construction heavy enough to
be blamed by its citizens, but not strong enough to guarantee economic order.
The coordination of budget rules, without shared economic policies, caused a
differential access to credit within the monetary union (the so-called spread),
and created unequal conditions in the single European market, contradicting
therefore  the  assumption  of  ordoliberalism  that  free  economy  can  be
functionally guaranteed only if the state ensures equilibrium and equality in
the market. 
Conceived by German economists as a moral stimulus to punish bad politics
and to force  reforms,  austerity  measures are  in fact  giving new impetus to
populistic  movements  all  around  the  continent.  The  negotiations  at  the
European summits are indeed perceived by the populations in a stereotypical
way, as a mere rehashing of British and French imperial pasts, and of German
8 See on this, MÜNKLER 2015.
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will to power. The Brexit campaign shows how strong the wartime image still is
in collective imaginary, and how germano-phobic slogans can still be effective. 
Like in the aftermath of the Great Depression, socio-psychological feelings of
decline  are  spreading  in  many  European  countries,  ending  up  generating
xenophobic fears and the research of scapegoats. This dangerous mood became
a wide-spreading political attitude in the West (especially in France) after the
terroristic attacks of the ISIS network, as well as in Central European countries,
which  are  now  crossed  by  migration  flows  coming  from  the  Middle  East
through  the  Balkans.  In  light  of  this  situation,  the  legitimacy  of  European
institutions  to  handle  these  economic  and  political  problems  is  put  into
question by European citizens, who rather see in a comeback to a strong idea of
national  identities  a  possible  path  out  of  all  these  troubles.  New forms  of
nationalism  throughout  the  European  countries  can  be  explained  as  a
consequence of the inability of Europe to effectively face its internal crisis. In
order to contrast this tendency, CASTALDI proposes a federalist solution, which
consists of a substantial enhancement of supranational institutions. For this to
happen,  it  is  of  utmost  importance  rethinking  the  relationship  between
democracy and people, by decoupling the notions of state and nation, or at
least of ethnos and demos, i.e. the sovereign community of the citizen on one
hand, and their national and ethnic community on the other. 
This  was  the  idea  at  the  core  of  Altiero  Spinelli’s  federalist  thought  and
political  agency.  Spinelli,  an anti-Stalinist  communist  who was  banned and
imprisoned by the fascist regime, acknowledged in the 1930s that national and
sovietic imperialisms were the main causes of the European wars and therefore
identified in the federation of the European states the supranational authority
that  could  ensure  peace,  constitutional  freedoms,  and  economic  wealth  to
European citizens. According to CASTALDI, Constitutional Europeism has both a
cultural  and  an  institutional  aspect.  He  suggests  that  the  European  Union
should enhance both its  supranational  and post-national  characters.  First,  it
should reinforce  its  suprarnational  (i.e.  federal)  institutions,  by  turning  the
Commission  into  a  real  European  governing  body,  which  must  take
responsibility  in  front  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  European
Council,  playing  the  role  of  a  High  Chamber  that  represents  the  member
states.9[9] According  to  Habermas,  sharing  sovereignty  with  the  Parliament
and delegating the executive functions to the Commission, the Council would
respect  the  double  sovereignty  that  the  European  citizenship  guarantees.10
[ Every European citizen is, in fact, both citizen of a nation state and of the
9 Among the many suggestions in this direction, see SPINELLI GROUP 2013. 
10 See HABERMAS 2014.
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European  Union.  European  Institutions  must,  therefore,  respect  the
sovereignty of both European citizens and nations, which are represented by
the Council. By sharing their power not only among each other but also and
foremost  with  the  European  Parliament,  the  leaders  of  the  Member  States
would  pave  the  way  for  European  post-national  politics.  Europe’s  self-
limitation, in the frame of a polycentric society – as wished by Shelkshorn – can
be ensured, according to CASTALDI, only within federal European institutions. It
is, therefore, time to address the problem of sovereignty in view of the effective
democratization of  Europe:  a  democracy which takes into account both the
single demos of the European citizen, as highlighted by the federalistic actions,
and the different demoi of the nation states, as stressed by the theoreticians of
“demoicracy”.11 The decision of Britons to leave the European Union and the
discussions  that  are  absorbing  the  European  institutions  between  the
supporters of “an ever closer union among the peoples and Member States of
the European Community”12 regard exactly whether and in which respect the
Union should opt for becoming either a confederation of democratic states or
the democratic federation of its citizens in one demos, or even a mix of the two.
If  Europe  still  believes  that  it  consists  of  the  supranational  project  of  a
spreading synthesis between nations that are not only united by their common
origins,  but  that  are  rather  entangled  in  the  rational  exchange  of  ideas  in
individual responsibility, as Husserl suggests, the European Union should look
for the institutional framework that embodies and enables at best  this ideal
task.
Among the submitted articles, we present four complementary approaches to
the  crisis,  understood as  an  economic,  political  and  cultural  issue.  On one
hand, James MENSCH and Timo MIETTINEN deal with the economic crisis that is
afflicting  Europe  since  2008.  While  MENSCH proposes  a  psychological
interpretation  of  the  inner  conflict  between  political  and  economic
understandings  of  the  European  project,  MIETTINEN analyzes  the
methodological  background  of  the  ruling  economic  policies,  that  is
ordoliberalism, and in so doing goes back to Walter Eucken’s interpretation of
phenomenology.  On  the  other  hand,  Rebecca  DEW and  Christian  STERNAD
situate  the  crisis  issue  within  wider  narratives  regarding  modernity  and
Europe.  DEW acknowledges  the  presence  of  elective  affinities  among  the
critiques that twentieth-century German thinkers, such as Arendt, Jaspers and
Strauss, addressed to modernity, which correspond for them to a dissolution of
11 See CHENEVAL/SCHIMMELFENNIG 2013, NICOLAÏDIS, Kalypso  2013.
12 See on this point,  the report of the UK Parliament about the recurrence of this phrase over EU
treaties: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7230.
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values.  From  a  different,  but  similar  angle,  STERNAD analyzes  the
understanding  of  the  genesis  of  Europe,  in  terms  of  a  philosophical  and
religious issue, following Husserl, Patočka, Zambrano and Derrida. 
James  MENSCH addresses in his article  the current  European crisis  from a
phenomenological-psychological  perspective.  Provocatively,  he  suggests  to
interpret the crisis of the European monetary union in terms of an identity
split,  which  demands  to  be  analysed  in  psychopathological  terms,  as  a
“multiple personality disorder”. In line with Plato’s analogy between soul and
state,  MENSCH drafts  a  psychological  diagnosis,  according  to  which  the
European monetary union presents different “personalities” that,  on regular
basis,  take full  control of its behaviour,  while their respective memories are
subjected to selective amnesia. By referring both to Husserl’s understanding of
egological identity and to Freud’s teleological interpretation of post-traumatic
strategies,  MENSCH applies  these  paradigms to  the  European Union.  In  this
perspective, he maintains that the European project results from the traumas
that marked Europe during the first half of twentieth century. Unable as it was
to  properly  elaborate  these  traumas,  Europe  remained  stuck  between  two
“personalities”, i.e. two fundamental aims: on one hand, the political task of
establishing a peaceful system, based on freedom, democracy and cooperation,
and of guaranteeing fundamental social, political, and economic rights; on the
other hand, the hidden dream of recovering the centrality that Europe had in
the  past,  when  it  was  the  strongest  world  power.  MENSCH identifies  two
strategies,  behind this contradictory identity.  On one side,  he highlights the
presence of a personality that fears that World Wars were caused by economic
catastrophes  (high  inflation-rate  in  Germany,  Great  Depression,  etc.),  and
reassures itself by mastering economy by political means, and by guaranteeing
civil and social rights, as well as the welfare state. On the other side, there is
another personality that, conversely, believes that World Wars were caused by
political  nationalism,  and,  therefore,  hopes  to  overcome  the  crisis  by
integrating the different European economies and by depriving them of the
independence they require to fight each other. This personality split shows its
pathological effects in the current institutional crises of the Union, which is not
able  to  provide  an  institutional  framework  to  integrate  and  overcome  this
contradiction.
In fact, as MENSCH shows, political and economic collectives behave according
to opposite forms of recognition:  while  those who live within a democratic
framework are at the same time, in their quality as citizens, makers of laws
(through their representatives) and subjected to them, as workers, on the other
side,  they  alienate  their  political  rights  to  their  employers.  After  the  2008
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financial crisis, the citizens at the periphery of Europe discovered the loss of
their rights as citizens, as soon as the “executive agency” was claimed by the
holders  of  their  countries’  bonds,  and  not  anymore  by  their  political
representatives,  who  were  forced  to  calm  the  markets  by  implementing
reforms. Because of their high debt level, many member states of the European
periphery  were  forced  to  outsource  their  political  sovereignty  to  financial
capitalism,  in  order to  pay back the political  time they have bought in  the
previous decades by short-term borrowings.13
The  economic  tradition  that  is  currently  leading  Europe  is  German
ordoliberalism, an economic position that corresponds much more to a moral
stance  than  to  a  specific  economic  doctrine.  PIANA proposes  an  in-depth
analysis of the philosophical background of ordoliberalism, by focusing on the
figure  of  Walter  Eucken  who  is  considered  its  symbolic  father.  MIETTINEN
sketches the historical background of the  Methodenstreit among economists in
late 19th Century and situates Eucken’s approach in the historical context of
the Freiburg university, where he was one of the very few who attempted an
intellectual response to the political and economic crisis of the by 1930s, by
combining a scientific critique of the centralized approach of national-socialism
and Stalinism with his personal engagement in the Freiburg resistance circle. 
Eucken’s  liberal  stance  is  characterized  by  a  strong  emphasis  on
constitutional choice and institutional issues. According to this view, the core
of  economic  life  is  identified  in  the  economic  constitution
(Wirtschaftsverfassung), and not for instance in the division of labour, or in the
relation  of  power  and technological  level.  Unlike  neoliberalism,  the  central
element  of  economics  consists  of  the  law,  and  not  of  individual  choices.
Considering the legal and moral  order as the basis of  liberalism (hence the
word “ordoliberalism”), economics is understood as the normative science of
ideal forms that have to be implemented in the life-worldly economy, in order
to guarantee order, norm stability and the dismantling of monopolies. 
Whilst Foucault considered Husserl’s phenomenology  toutcourt as the main
background for the idealistic approach of ordoliberalism, MIETTINEN refers this
approach back to Eucken’s reading of Husserl, and thus shows how Eucken
conflates  Husserl’s  accurate  distinction between several  realms of  idealities,
especially  ignoring  the  concrete  bond  that,  according  to  genetic
phenomenology, links material (i.e. non formal) idealities to their life-worldly
horizons. 
While Husserl’s  ethics situates the maxim: “do your best  under the given
circumstances” in concrete and individual situations as a plea for  renewing
13 See on this, STREECK 2014.
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decisions  and  even  norms,  Eucken’s  ordoliberalism neglects,  in  MIETTINEN’s
reading,  the  inequalities  that  are  de  facto widespread among market  actors.
According  to  ordoliberalism,  economics  should  be  understood  as  an  exact
science, and should therefore deal with ideal forms rather than with concrete
production and exchange. When, after the Second World War, ordoliberalism
became the leading school of thought in the German Federal Republic, it led,
on one side, to the design of an ideal legal framework and of an impartial and
strong  governance;  on  the  other,  it  also  led  to  a  strict  separation  between
economics and politics. 
The  fundamental  decision  for  this  economic  system  is  the  only  political
moment  where  economics  and  politics  converge.  Besides  that,  there  is  no
longer space for genuine politics within the economic domain. This stance was
probably motivated by Eucken’s  resistance against  national  socialism in  the
1930s: by pleading for a free economy, arbitrated by a fair and impartial state,
Eucken  stood  for  liberalism  both  in  economics  and  politics.  He  therefore
stressed the rule of ideal laws against the thread of pressures by economic and
political groups. Nonetheless,  his understanding of economics as a realm of
exact idealities led to a problematic hypostatization of law and order as the
basic tools of economic policies. In this respect, he neglects the more dynamic
aspects of Husserl’s understanding of the role of ideals in concrete moral life.
Eventually,  MIETTINEN concludes  his  historical  and  philosophical
reconstruction, showing how the current governance of the monetary union is
driven by the ordoliberal credo. 
Rebecca  DEW addresses the crisis concept by dealing with Hannah Arendt,
Karl  Jaspers,  Leo  Strauss,  and  their  critiques  of  modernity,  which  she
understands as “thoughtful perspectives in a thoughtless age”. Starting from
the  overlapping  of  the  anti-modernist  stances,  which  are  present  in  these
philosophers’  thought,  DEW comes  to  show  their  affinity  with  Heidegger’s
account of Western metaphysics, as well as with his project of forcing a new
metaphysical beginning. 
A  sort  of  “thought  deprivation”  is  one  of  the  shapes  that,  according  to
Arendt, decline takes in modernity and especially in modern philosophy. For
Arendt, modernity is at its core a crisis of forgetfulness, the loss of tradition
and  authority  in  politics  and  education.  Jaspers  used  similar  terms,  while
dealing  with  modernity  in  terms  of  a  process  of  bureaucratization  and
technologization, of which isolation, consumerism, and the emergence of mass
society  were  the  most  apparent  traits.  Strauss  stressed,  on  his  side,  the
devastation of traditional ways of living, which according to him was mainly
caused by Western thinkers, such as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Common to
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all these interpretations – as well as to Heidegger’s – in an understanding of
modernity as tragically detached from a past “golden age”, in which a greater
level of truth and authenticity characterized human existence.14
Whilst  Jaspers pleas for  human responsibility,  as  a  way to contrast  of  the
atomic  thread,  whose  catastrophe  he  understands  as  the  symptom  of  the
application  of  specialized  sciences  to  the  world  of  human  affairs,  Arendt
suggests that modernity itself is a catastrophe of thought and of language: a
worldless era, in which humankind lives in isolation and alienation, under the
“law of the desert”.15 According to both Strauss and Arendt, philosophy is a
core  element  of  modernity;  whilst  the  former,  though,  identifies  modern
philosophy in the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Nietzsche, for Arendt the
site of rupture, which determines the birth of modern thought, corresponds
rather to Descartes’s methodological doubt. In Strauss’ reading, the spreading
of this generalized mistrust in the world manifests indeed better than anything
else the crisis and instability of contemporary society. 
In order to contrast modern scepticism, these thinkers invoke a reduction of
the claims of science, which should not to be understood as the topos of human
rationality, but rather as a limited academic endeavour, with restricted political
applicability. Moreover, today’s science should refer its ancient-Greek models,
in  order  to  re-establish  the  centrality  of  thinking,  in  our  thoughtless  era.
Following this arguments, DEW goes as far as to foresee the possible rising of a
new form of polity to come, which would be heir of both the Roman republican
and  of  the  nation-state  models  and  of  the  nation-state  tradition.  This  new
political  conformation  might  be  able  to  provide  his  members  with  a  new
“home”, i.e.  with new sense of ownership, belonging, and continuity, which
would be founded on a renewed care for natality,  beyond any ethnical  and
religious prejudice.
Christian  STERNAD follows  in  his  reconstruction  of  Europe’s  genealogy  a
similar interpretative path. After having pinpointed what for him are the limits
of Husserl’s reduction of “spiritual Europe” to a form of universal rationality,
STERNAD undertakes  a  deconstruction  of  Husserl’s  unilateral  account,  by
problematizing the role that Christianity played in the European construction.
In so doing, he goes along with Patočka’s, Zambrano’s and Derrida’s attempts
14 This sense of loss, and of nostalgia for a greater past, cannot be limited to philosophical research,
but  is  rather  widespread  in  the  various  intellectual  accounts  of  the  crisis  of  modernity,  which
emerged in the first decades of twentieth century. See on this, for instance, SPENGLER 1926-28; ORTEGA
Y GASSET, Man and Crisis 1958; HUIZINGA 1936.
15 Interestingly enough,  this  same metaphor also  emerges in Heidegger’s  Schwarze  Hefte,  denoting
modernity’s effects, which Heidegger understands though as caused by the Jewish machinery. See
on this, DI CESARE 2014.
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to overcome Husserl’s rationalism.
According  to  STERNAD,  Husserl’s  understanding  of  Europe,  as  it  is  solely
grounded  on  a  philosophical  stance,  risks  to  cause  a  “mystification  of  the
history of culture”. This phrase was coined by Derrida, in order to pinpoint the
hypocrite  nature  of  any  mono-genealogical  account  of  Europe’s  origins.
STERNAD argues  that  Husserl’s  attempt  to  save  rationality  led  him  to  the
exclusion  of  religious  traditions,  understood  as  historical,  cultural,  social,
political and even ethical forces. According to this interpretation, Husserl’s plea
for cultural renewal by means of practical reason is interpreted as an attack
against traditional forms of life conduct.
Unlike Husserl,  Patočka considered Europe both a rational  and a Christian
project,  distinguishing  thereby  between  theoretical  logos  and  religious
rationality. The theoretical stance can be either scientific, i.e. aimed at coping
with reality, or philosophical, as it is oriented toward the essence of what is.
Religion, on the other hand, corresponds in its core to a a-theoretical form of
rationality, which cannot be properly grasped by philosophy. Patočka criticizes
therefore  Husserl  for  having  overlooked,  in  his  genealogy  of  European
rationality,  Europe’s  hidden  religious  component.  Since  reason  has  two
complementary  faces  –  one  based  on  mystical  worship,  and  one  on  sober
intellectualism –  problems emerge  as  soon as  the  latter  demands universal
validity. In this respect,  STERNAD lingers on Patočka’s suggestion that Europe
has not been able yet to develop a properly Christian rationality. This kind of
rationality  might  indeed  become  the  most  powerful  recovery  from  the
decadence that the oblivion of the care for the soul and the predominance of
technical administration in modern times have caused.
Whilst Patočka underlined the need to intermingle theoretical and religious
reason,  Maria  Zambrano  dealt  with  Catholicism  in  terms  of  the  authentic
Augustinian  philosophy.  Doing  this,  she  interpreted  religion  as  the  vera
philosophia that  the  Greeks  prepared  and  the  Church  later  fulfilled,  by
attempting to realise the civitas Dei on earth. Following this interpretation, the
crisis to which First World War gave birth is essentially a religious crisis. 
As  for  Derrida,  STERNAD shows how he  started in  1989  a  reflection  upon
Europe’s  identity  and  future,  in  light  of  the  events  which  marked  Eastern
Europe and also of the bicentenary of the French revolution. In the aftermath
of the wars of twentieth century, Derrida pleads for an unrealized Europe, an
idea that has yet to rise, and for a Europe that cannot accept to be identical
with itself. Any discourse about Europe in form of an autobiography should be
therefore be replaced by a narration from a point of view of alterity. 
Starting  from  Patočka’s  claim  that  Christianity  is  still  the  unthought-of
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element of Europe, Derrida stresses that Christianity as such is still yet to come.
Expanding on this idea, he suggests that an authentically Christian Europe, in
order to be developed in its full-fledged potentialities, should get rid of every
Greek  remains.  He  indicates  the  platonic  polis as  the  obstacle  to  the  full
unfolding of authentic Christian politics. According to Derrida’s speculations,
Europe can have a future only if it takes a distance both from Athens and Rom,
breaking up with Greek-platonic-roman politics. Only by doing this, it could
eventually reach an authentic religious experience, or mysterium tremendum. 
Following the  steps  of  Patočka,  Zambrano and Derrida,  STERNAD ends  up
arguing that an understanding of Europe that does not rely only on its origins,
but that rather tackles the contradictions which inhere to its conflictual identity
and that refuses any unilateral account of reason, is necessary.
We are honoured to share in the section “Path of Method” Giovanni PIANA’s
reflections upon phenomenology as a method, translated from the Italian by
Michela Summa.
PIANA’s quest for a rigorous phenomenology begins with a disambiguation of
phenomenology’s famous plea: “back to the things themselves”. Reading this
claim against the background of Gestalt psychology, PIANA argues that it is not a
generic plea for philosophical innocence or the appeal to an aware dismantling
of every kind of unconscious prejudices, but rather the uncovering of a set of
well-determined  opinions,  with  precise  theoretical  consequences,  mostly
inspired by psychological associationism.
PIANA distinguishes the theoretical core of phenomenology as a philosophical
method (distinguished from preliminary stages of psychological research) and
Husserl’s attempt to use it for answering his time’s appeals and tensions. The
problem of  method became for  Husserl  entangled with ethical  tasks,  while
phenomenology took more and more the shape of a philosophy of subjectivity,
until  the  idea  of  phenomenology was  presented as  the  only  answer  to  the
concept  of  crisis.  PIANA is  quite  sarcastic  about  re-propositions  of  this
overlapping of method and crisis: While the rhetoric of the crisis gets poorer
the more it is iterated outside of its historical horizon, the theoretical core of
phenomenology as a method can be grasped in its validity only beyond it as
the analytic task driven by a theory of the intentionality of conscious acts. 
In the line of this analytic interpretation of phenomenology, PIANA sets clarity
as the first goal of philosophy, i.e. bringing order in thinking. And, for the sake
of clarity, he does not hesitate to define phenomenology as a – rather complex
and  sophisticated  –  intuitionistic  method.  However,  intuition  has  not  to  be
intended as a special form of knowledge for otherwise inaccessible truths, not
as the  only  leap into  metaphysical  realms,  but  rather  as  a  method to  trace
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modes of being by describing structural modes of manifestation. The goal is
not  to  describe  phenomenological  givens,  but  phenomenological  rules  or
structures:  it  is  to  sketch  a  phenomenologically  grounded  ontology.
Philosophical analysis deals with the process of “concept formation” from the
inner structures of experience up to more independent idealities, from general
regularities that are directly graspable in the configuration of what is given to
more abstract concepts.
Finally,  PIANA underlines  that  his  structural  approach  to  phenomenology,
presented also through the metaphor of “a geometry of experience”, radically
departs  from  existentialistic  motives  present  in  the  tradition  of
phenomenology.
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